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INTRODUCTION TO A FORUM ON THE
INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED
Ernest N. Warrent
We are thus again confronted with the problem of achieving "a balance
between the competing interests of society in the protection of cherished
individual rights * ** and in effective law enforcement and investigation
of crime."'

It was early recorded in sacred writings that "the way of transgressors
is hard."2
The statements of the participants in the forum on "Interrogation
of the Accused" sponsored by the District Attorneys' Association of
the State of New York and held at the Astor Hotel in New York City
on January 31, 1964, indicate that the way of transgressors is not as
hard as formerly and that the balance between the competing interests
of society and individual freedom and effective investigation of crime
is tipped on the side of individual freedom.
The rules of evidence which determine admissibility of proffered
testimony are essentially rules of exclusion.8 Professor Maguire has
characterized the subject of evidence as "a study of calculated and help4
ful obstructionism."1
The rules of evidence have been formulated primarily by the courts,
with minor assistance from constitutional provisions and statutory enactments, to regulate evidence submitted to lay juries for the determination
of contested questions of fact.5
Evidence has been excluded primarily for two reasons: (1) to preclude unreliable and misleading information from reaching the jury;
and (2) to protect an individual or a relationship, although the evidence
j- A.B. 1928, Hamilton College; LL.B. 1931, Cornell University. Professor of Law, Cornell
Law School. Member of the New York Bar. President of Tompkins County Bar Association (1964). The author of this introduction is solely responsible for the contents thereof
and the views expressed therein.
1 Fuld, J., in People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 150, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d
841, 842 (1963) quoting People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 564, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216
N.Y.S.2d 70, 73 (1961).
2 Proverbs, 13:15.
8 Richardson, Evidence § 5 (8th ed. 1955); Wigmore, Evidence § 10 (3d ed. 1940).
4 Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law 11 (1947).
5 Fisch, New York Evidence § 2 (1959); 1 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 8.
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excluded in the process is highly probative and trustworthy. The second
basis for exclusion rests on extrinsic policies irrespective of probative
value.6 This forms the basis for the exclusion of confidential communications between husband and wife, 7 attorney and client,8 physician and
patient,' and penitent and priest."°
In recent years the courts have excluded reliable and probative evidence to control the conduct of law enforcement officers. The United
States Supreme Court has frankly recognized this development. In
Rea v. United States" the Supreme Court directed that a federal
narcotics agent be enjoined from testifying in a state court prosecution
concerning narcotics obtained by the agent by an illegal search.
Justice Douglas in the opinion written for the Court stated that:
In this posture we have then a case that raises not a constitutional quesour supervisory powers over federal law enforcetion but one concerning
2
ment agencies.'
There is no doubt that the decision of the Supreme Court in Mapp v.
Ohio,13 overruling Wolf v. Colorado'4 which was decided only twelve
years earlier, was made to protect the individual against the use of
evidence obtained improperly by police and thereby to discourage unconstitutional police procedures. Mapp had to be decided on constitutional grounds for all must agree that the Supreme Court does not have
general "supervisory powers" over state law enforcement officers. The
supervision of state criminal proceedings by the United States Supreme
Court through the application of the fourteenth amendment has frequently bewildered the state courts and the state law enforcement officers, and sometimes even members of the Supreme Court. Justice Minton
in his dissenting opinion in Leyro v. Denna'5 stated:
New York must be mystified in its efforts to enforce its law against homiof fact to a
cide to have us say it may not submit a disputed question
jury. The Court holds that to do so denies due process. 16
6 Id. § 11.

7 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4502 [hereinafter cited as CPLR].
8 CPLR § 4503.
9 CPLR § 4504.
10 CPLR § 4505.
11 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
12 Id. at 216-17. This was a five-four decision in the Supreme Court. justice Harlan

writing for the dissenting justices said:
The holding that an injunction should issue . . . is rested on this Court's "supervisory
powers over federal law enforcement agencies." So far as I know, this is the first
time it has been suggested that the federal courts share with the executive branch
of the Government responsibility for supervising law enforcement activities as such.
Id. at 218.

13 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

14 338 U.S. 25 (1949), 35 Cornell L.Q. 625 (1950).
15 347 U.S. 556 (1954).

I' Id. at 589.
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The courts of New York have in turn further mystified the state law
enforcement officers by unprecedented decisions excluding evidence in
criminal trials. By a series of recent cases, the Court of Appeals has
ruled that all statements made by an accused in the absence of counsel
7
after indictment or arraignment cannot be used to convict him.'
In People v. Robinson'l8 a voluntary statement made by the accused
after arraignment to an acquaintance who occupied an adjoining cell
in the jail, was excluded. The statement does not need to be the product
of police interrogation. The court said:
All postarraignment statements made in the absence of counsel are
inadmissible.... Where, as here, the arraignment on a vagrancy charge
is merely a sham... the admissions are excluded because they were made
the
during a period when the detention was merely a pretext for holding
defendant in connection with the investigation of the homicide. 19
The court in Robinson also applied the "poison fruit" doctrine. The guns
discovered by the police by virtue of the inadmissible incriminating
statements were also held inadmissible. It seems permissible to conclude
that in the last several years the Court of Appeals has consistently
increased the protection of individual rights at the expense of effective
law enforcement.
In recent years the New York State Legislature has enacted some
legislation to facilitate police procedures at the expense of individual
rights. In 1963, the legislature increased the authority of police officers
to arrest by providing that a police officer can arrest without a warrant
when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime is being committed in his presence.2"
The legislature also expanded the concept of "property" subject to
seizure under a search warrant by including "property constituting
evidence of a crime or tending to show that a particular person committed a crime."21 Previously a search warrant could not be issued to
search for evidence qua evidence, but only for the illegal fruits of a
crime alleged to be in possession of an accused. 2
(after
17 People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962)
arraignment), 49 Cornell L.Q. 145 (1963); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.
445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961) (after indictment); People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166
N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
18 13 N.Y.2d 296, 196 N.E.2d 261, 246 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1963).
'9 Id. at 301, 196 N.E.2d at 262, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 624-25. For a contrary holding, see
2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825, cert. granted, 375 U.S. 902 (1963), 1963 U.
People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill.

fI1. L.F. 511.

-N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177 (Supp. 1963).
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 792. (Supp. 1963). The constitutionality of this section
was sustained in People v. Carroll, 38 Misc. 2d 630, 238 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1963).
22 See Comment, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 319 (1953).
20
21
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In 1964, the legislature passed the "no-knock" statute and the "stopand-frisk" statute. The "no-knock" statute authorizes a police officer
to break open a door without notice if the judge issuing the search
warrant authorizes that procedure.2 3 The "stop-and-frisk" statute authorizes a police officer to stop a person abroad in a public place whom he
reasonably suspects is committing a crime, and, when the officer reasonably suspects he is in danger, to search such person for a dangerous
weapon. 24 These statutes were passed over strong opposition.
However, it should also be noted that the New York Legislature
has recently passed statutes protecting individual rights at the expense
of probative evidence. The most dramatic example is found in the eavesdropping statutes.25 Evidence obtained by illegal eavesdropping is now
excluded in criminal proceedings as well as in civil actions.20
Commissioner Murphy in his opening remarks in the following panel
discussion stated as follows:
To arrive at the truth, it is incumbent upon the police to question the
suspect in order to obtain necessary evidence, and sometimes, even more

27
importantly, to exonerate him, if the evidence so warrants.

This statement appears sound. In Stein v. New York 28 the Court
said:
Interrogation does have social value in solving crime .... By their own

answers many suspects clear themselves, and the information they give
frequently points out another who is guilty. Indeed, interrogation of those
who know something about the facts is the chief means to solution of
crime. The duty to disclose knowledge rests upon all citizens. It is so
vital that one known to be innocent may be detained, in the absence of
bail, as a material witness. This court never has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state from such detention and interrogation of a
suspect as under the circumstances appears reasonable and not coercive.
The title of this symposium, namely, "A Forum on the Interrogation
of the Accused,"29 signifies the crux of the interrogation problem. It is
one thing to interrogate a suspect and another to interrogate an accused.
An accused is a person charged with a crime.8 0 Somewhere and sometime
in between the process of questioning a person suspected of a crime
and the interrogation of an accused who has been taken into custody by
the police, legitimate investigatibn may change into an illegal inquisition.
23 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 799 (effective July 1, 1964).
24 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a (effective July 1, 1964).
25 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a (Supp. 1963); N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 738-45 (Supp. 1963).
26 CPLR § 4506.
27 "A Forum on the Interrogation of the Accused," 49 Cornell L.Q. 382, 383 (1964).
28 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953).
29 Emphasis added.
30 Black, Law Dictionary 39 (4th ed. 1951); Bouvier, Law Dictionary 35 (Baldwin ed.
1934).
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This is not a new problem. 1 It is an old problem with new and more
stringent ground rules."2
Obviously, we are all on the side of law and order and the angels.
However, it is frequently difficult to identify and locate the angels in this
critical field of police interrogation. The panel discussion helps to
identify the angels, and sheds welcome light in an effort to achieve "a
balance between the competing interests of society in the protection of
cherished individual rights . . . and in effective law enforcement and
investigation of crime."'
81 See C. Pound, "Inquisitorial Confessions," 1 Cornell L.Q. 77, 80 (1916).
32 See Hogan & Snee, "The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue,"
47 Geo. LJ. 1, 25 (1958) where the authors state that "the system of administering
criminal law in this country has degenerated into an incredible hybrid of the accustorial
and inquisitorial." See also McCormick, Evidence § 119 (1954).
33 Fuld, J., in People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 150, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d
841, 842 (1963) quoting People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 564, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447,
216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73 (1961).

